In this paper we contribute to the debate over the empirical relationship between trade openness and economic development. Unlike previous studies which treat trade openness and institutions as competitors in economic development, we find evidence that they are in fact complements. We also find that in order for a country to benefit from trade, its institutional quality has to be above a threshold level. These results are suggestive of a very important complementary role of both trade openness and institutions in economic development.
I. Introduction
The relationship between trade and development has been a topic of research for a few decades now. Until recently, it appeared that a growing academic as well as policy consensus was emerging on the positive effects of trade on development. Dollar (1992) using an 'index of real exchange rate distortion' and an 'index of real exchange rate variability' show that outward orientation is good for economic growth. Sachs and Warner (1995) In another influential study, Frankel and Romer (1999) show that there is a positive relationship between trade volumes and national income to the extent that the increase in trade volume is a result of a reduction in natural or geographical barriers to trade and not trade policy.
They use the geographical components of trade volumes as an instrument to identify the effects of trade on income.
In the policy arena, the World Bank emphasizes the advantages of trade openness especially for the developing economies. In their report entitled 'Globalization, Growth and Poverty', they Nevertheless, this growing consensus was shattered by a Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) critical survey of the literature. They show that the findings of the empirical literature are not robust due to the difficulties in measuring openness, statistically sensitive specifications, the collinearity of protectionist policies with other bad policies, and other econometric problems. In an empirical study using data since 1870 Vamvakidis (2002) finds no support for a positive growth-openness connection before 1970.
In a recent paper, Rodrik et al. (2004) also challenge the Frankel and Romer (1999) result.
Using an instrumental variable estimation technique and a cross-country study, they show that institutions dominate the influence of both trade and geography as the fundamental determinant of long-run economic development.
1 Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) analyze the interrelationship between rule of law, democracy, openness and income. They find that openness negatively impacts income level.
This conclusion however is challenged by Dollar and Kraay (2003) . They argue that crosscountry regressions of the log-level of per capita GDP on instrumented measures of trade and institutional quality is uninformative about the relative importance of trade and institutions in the long-run because of very high correlation between the latter two variables. Using an empirical growth model and panel data they show that improvements in trade and institutions have positive effects on growth.
Given the doubts that these studies have created about the empirical relationship between trade and economic development, further research on this topic is certainly called for. In this study 1 Their results build on the findings of the highly influential work by Acemolgu et al. (2001) which shows a strong impact of institutions on long-run economic development without claiming dominance.
we take a fresh look at the empirical relationship between trade and development in a model which also accounts for the effect of institutions on development. Our major contributions are as follows.
Unlike previous studies which look at the partial effects of trade and institutions in a linear regression model and hence treat them as competitors in economic development, we look at the complementarities between these two variables. We do this by introducing an interactive variable in the model which is a product of the institutional quality measure and trade. We observe that the coefficient on the interactive variable is positive and statistically significant which is indicative of the complementary effects of trade and institutions on development. We also observe that in order for a country to benefit from trade, its institutional quality has to be above the threshold level. This is indicative of the fact that relaxing trade barriers or increasing trade share alone may not be beneficial for a country with weak institutions. In order to exploit the variation across time we estimate our model using panel data. Also, to tackle endogeneity problems we use instrumental variables to identify the complementary effects of trade and institutions on economic development.
Using a similar framework, we also test the relationship between trade policy openness and economic development. We find that long-run policy openness matters more than short-run policy openness and countries with better institutions benefit more from trade policy openness than countries with weak institutions.
We contribute to the literature by showing that trade and institutions are complements in economic development. Trade induces economic development and institutional change by strengthening commercial interest (see . This is over and above the direct effect of institutions on development. 2 In this sense, our results are closest to the findings of 3 who using historical data show that Western European countries with nonabsolutist institutions (where merchants' property rights were relatively better protected) benefited relatively more from Atlantic trade compared to countries with non-absolutist institutions (where merchants faced relatively high risk of expropriation of their property by the monarch). However, there are significant differences between our work and theirs. First, our results are more general as they are based on data from a large cross-national sample and not just Western Europe. Second, our main focus is on the period 1980 to 2004 whereas they focus on the period 1500 to 1850. Third, our focus is on trade in general whereas they look at the effect of Atlantic trade.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, we specify the empirical strategy.
In section III, we introduce the dataset. In section IV, we present our empirical results. Section V concludes the study.
II. Empirical Strategy
To uncover the complementarities between institutions and trade share in economic development, we estimate an equation of the form: 
where log srt y is a measure of current level of economic development in country in region r averaged over years to typically measured by the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita PPP,
α are regional dummy variables controlling for region specific time invariant unobserved transfer of skill-biased technology which increases the income share of the middle class. Rogowski (1989) show that trade affects development and institutions through changes in factor prices and domestic political alignments.
3 In a related paper using cross-section data for the 1990s (averaged) Neeman et al. (2006) (1980, 1985, 1990 , and 1995) for each country.
The major variables that we use in this study are: log GDP per capita, trade share, short run trade policy openness, long-run trade policy openness, and expropriation risk. Table 1 Measuring trade openness is always difficult. We use two measures of openness in our study.
First, is the trade share of GDP which shows the degree of a countries engagement in trade.
This obviously has the advantage of being clearly defined and well measured. However, this does not tell us anything about why some countries trade more. The measure ranges from zero to ten where higher values indicate a lower probability of expropriation of private property by the state. There are other measures of institutions (rule of law index, repudiation of contracts, executive constraints, corruption, democracy etc.) used in the literature. However, none of these measures except rule of law have statistically robust effects on economic development (see Bhattacharyya, 2008) . The problem with the rule of law index however is that it is not available in a panel. Hence we use expropriation risk which is the most robust statistically. Furthermore, expropriation risk is also the closest to North's (1981) definition of good institutions 7 as it captures the notion of extractive state. The between variation (1.84 between standard deviation) in this variable is higher than the within variation (1.45 within standard deviation). In our sample Japan, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, the Netherlands are among the countries with the best set of institutions whereas Niger, Nigeria, Panama are among the countries with the weakest institutions.
IV. Evidence
This section systematically tests whether institutions and trade are complements in economic development. We first provide the basic results and then conduct some robustness tests. The problem with this specification and the specifications adopted by the previous studies is that it implicitly assumes institutions and trade are competitors in economic development. In institutional quality is 7.7 which sit well within the sample range of 1 and 10. 8 The point estimate suggests that one sample standard deviation increase in trade share in a country with an average institutional quality 7.8 over the period 1980 to 1995 9 will lead to a 1 fold increase in per capita GDP. To put this into perspective, the model explains 2 fold of the 57 fold per capita GDP difference between India (trade share 21.78 and institutional quality 9.9) and the U.K (trade share 55.9 and institutional quality 10) in 1995.
A. Basic Results
We also plot the partial effect of trade on development against institutions (see Figure 1) . is a threshold level of institutional quality beyond which the partial effect of trade policy on economic development is positive. 10 For countries lying below the institutional quality threshold, the partial effect is negative. The threshold level of institutions required to make contemporaneous trade policy work is 6.5 which is also within the sample range of 1 and 10. However, this model suffers from endogeneity. It is highly likely that current level of development affecting contemporaneous or short-run trade policy rather than causality running in the opposite direction. In that case the point estimates of this model are unreliable.
To tackle the endogeneity problems associated with a trade policy measure, we adopt two strategies. First, we use a long-run trade policy measure (fraction of openness years since 1950)
instead of a contemporaneous trade policy measure (fraction of openness years since 4 t − ). We assume the long-run trade policy measure to be exogenous. Second, we estimate our model using the instrumental variable method. We discuss them as follows.
In column (8) we look at the unconditional correlation between long-run trade policy openness and economic development. The point estimate is positive and statistically significant.
The size of the estimate is also comparable with the size that we worked out in column (5). A one sample standard deviation increase in long-run trade policy openness in an average economy will lead to a 1.2 fold increase in the per capita GDP. In column (9) we add institutions into the specification and we observe that the long-run trade policy openness variable is no longer 10 The partial effect of contemporaneous trade policy on development is given by 1.63 0.25
15 statistically significant. The only statistically significant variable is institutional quality. To check for complementarities between long-run trade policy openness and institutional quality, in column (10) we add an interactive term which is defined as a scalar product of these two variables. We observe that the coefficient estimate of the interactive term is positive and statistically significant. In Table 3 we report the first stage regressions of the IV estimates reported in columns (4) and (12) of Table 2 . The instruments that we use for the IV estimation are valid as they are correlated with the suspected endogenous variables and also exogenous to the model. We perform overidentification test to check the exogeneity of the instruments. The test p-values are reported in columns (4) and (12) of Table 2 . They confirm that the instruments are exogenous. The high pvalues indicate that we fail to reject the null of exogeneity of the instruments. In column (1) of Table 3 we notice that the partial relationship between trade share and ' Frankel and Romer (1999) constructed openness instrument' is positive. We also notice that the relationship between trade share and population density in 1500, EURFRAC, and area are negative. A reasonable explanation for the negative coefficient on population density in 1500 is perhaps the fact that countries with higher density of population in general trades less externally as there is a larger market for internal trade. If population density is persistent over time then this effect is also likely to persist over time. In Table 4 we explore in greater detail where the complementarities between trade and institutions are coming from. In other words, we look at the source of identification of the complementarities. If most of the identification is due to cross-sectional differences between countries that are permanent in nature then we will not find anything in the fixed effect regressions.
However, it could also be because of some common omitted factors such as culture or geography driving both complementarities effect and per capita income. We try to explore this by introducing country fixed effects into our preferred models reported in columns (4), (7), (10), and (12) of Table   2 . Column (1) of Table 4 reports a regression involving trade share when country fixed effects are introduced. We observe that the interactive term * srt srt TR INS is no longer statistically significant which is perhaps indicative of the fact that the permanent cross-country differences are driving the complementarities effect and within country differences over time does not seem to matter that much. Geography can be a possible source of identification. In column (2) we test this by replacing country fixed effects with latitude. We notice that the coefficient on latitude is positive and statistically significant and the interactive term is no longer significant. This is perhaps indicative of the fact that geography is driving both the differences in living standards and complementarities between 'trade and institutions'. This is consistent with previous findings in the literature that geography and disease environment shape the long-run evolution of institutions and trade (see and statistically significant. In column (5) we check how much of this effect is due to permanent cross-country difference such as geography or culture and how much is due to within country difference. We do this by replacing country fixed effects with latitude. We observe that the complementarities effect survives which indicates some part of this effect is coming from the within country variation.
The fundamental difference in results between the trade share openness model and the trade policy openness models with the inclusion of country fixed effects and latitude could be because of the difference in the construction of these two measures. Trade share perhaps reflects a part of openness which is deeper and largely time invariant 12 whereas trade policy does get influenced by short-term changes in the policy environment. However, we do admit that in the absence of truly exogenous variation, our analysis does not resolve the identification issues.
B. Robustness
In Tables 5 and 6 we report the robustness tests on our two preferred models (columns (4) and (12) of Table 2 ). In Table 5 we focus on the robustness of the partial effect of trade share on economic development by adding additional control variables which are often reported by previous studies to be correlated with development. In column (1) we introduce schooling as an additional control variable. The complementarities between trade share and institutions survive as we have a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the interactive term * srt srt TR INS . The threshold level of institutional quality required for trade to work in this case is 4. This is well within the sample range but certainly on the lower side when compared to our preferred estimate of 7.7. In column (2) we add investment and find that the complementarities effect survives. The institutional quality threshold in this case is 8 which is close to our preferred estimate. In columns (3), (4), (5), and (6) we add foreign aid, ethnic fractionalization, black market premium, and share of mining to GDP as additional controls respectively. We observe that the complementarities effect holds in all the cases. The institutional quality thresholds in these models are 7.1, 7.4, 9, and 8 respectively which are all close to the preferred estimate of 7.7.
In Table 6 we report the robustness results involving the trade policy openness measures. By adding additional controls we check the robustness of the partial effect of long-run trade policy on economic development. We use the same set of additional controls as and statistically significant. The institutional quality thresholds for the partial effect of long-run trade policy on per capita GDP to be positive are 6.7, 7.1, 6.7, 7.3, 7.1, and 7.3 for specifications when schooling, investment, foreign aid, ethnic fractionalization, black market premium, and share of mining to GDP are used as additional control variables respectively. These estimates are not far from our preferred estimate of 7.3.
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Therefore based on these tests it is perhaps fair to say that the observed complementarities between trade openness (both trade share and trade policy) and institutions in the data is reasonably robust to the inclusion of additional controls variables into our model. 13 We also notice that the estimate of the threshold level of institutional quality required for a positive effect of trade (both trade share and trade policy) is also reasonably robust.
V. Conclusion
Our results suggest that there is a reasonably robust correlation between trade openness and economic development when the complementarities between institutions and trade are taken into account. This is done by introducing an interactive variable which is a scalar product of institutional quality and trade into the model. The coefficient on the interactive variable is positive and statistically significant which is indicative of the complementary effects of trade and institutions on development. However, questions regarding identification remain due to the absence of truly exogenous variation in macro trade data. The co-movement in trade institutions and development can be due to some other factors (culture or geography or both) which are driving all three of them.
Still, the fact that the results are robust to the inclusion of schooling, investment, foreign aid, ethnic fractionalization, black market premium, and share of mining to GDP is encouraging enough for an interpretation of this effect as the combined impact of trade and institutions on economic development.
We also observe that for the partial effect of trade on development to be positive, a country's institutional quality has to be above a threshold level. This is indicative of the fact that relaxing trade barriers or increasing trade share alone may not be beneficial for a developing country if sufficient resources are not employed into improving institutions. Strong institutions improve private investors' confidence which is crucial for economic development. We list the partial effects for individual countries in our sample of 59 former colonies in the appendix.
The results contribute to a growing body of literature on trade and development and perhaps open up the whole debate on the interrelationship between trade, institutions, and economic development. The challenge however is to take this beyond broad cross-country comparison to the detailed workings of institutions and trade policy and its impact on economic development. Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. Columns (2) and (5) reports Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates. The instruments used are log settler mortality, log population density in 1500, fraction of population speaking English (ENGFRAC), fraction of population speaking other European languages (EURFRAC), Frankel and Romer (1999) constructed openness (CONST), landlocked dummy, and land area. Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. All regressions are estimated using the instrumental variable estimation method. The instruments used are log settler mortality, log population density in 1500, fraction of population speaking English (ENGFRAC), fraction of population speaking other European languages (EURFRAC), Frankel and Romer (1999) constructed openness (CONST), landlocked dummy, and land area. 
